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We examine if and how incumbent firms respond to entry, and entry threats, using non-price modes of competition.  
Our analysis focuses on service quality within the airline industry.  We find that incumbent on-time performance 
actually worsens in response to entry, and even entry threats, by Southwest Airlines.  Given Southwest’s general 
superiority in on-time performance, this result is consistent with equilibria of theoretical models of quality and price 
competition, which generally predict  differentiation along quality.  We corroborate this intuition with further 
analysis, showing there is no notable response by incumbents when an airline with average on-time performance 
(Continental) threatens to enter or enters a route. 
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1.  Introduction 
  As evidenced by the recent explosion of research on differentiated products competition, 
understanding how firms and products compete along dimensions other than price (e.g., quality) 
is both very important from a management and policy viewpoint, and highly relevant to many 
industries.  One question of particular interest to academics and practitioners is how firm entry 
into a market impacts quality provision.  From theoretical and empirical analyses, much is 
known about the relationship between entry and price, and even the threat of entry and price.  
However, very little is known about the effect of entry (or the threat of entry) on firms’ provision 
of quality.   
  In this paper, we examine if and how incumbents adjust their quality provision in 
response to entry and entry threats.  Specifically, we assess how incumbent airlines adjust their 
on-time performance in response to entry and entry threats by Southwest Airlines.  The airline 
industry provides an ideal setting to conduct this analysis since data on airline on-time 
performance provide a good measure of product quality and are readily available, and entry and 
entry threats by Southwest are easily observable (Goolsbee & Syverson 2008).   
This paper builds on and contributes to three streams of literature.  The first focuses on 
non-price responses to entry.  While it has been widely established, both theoretically and 
empirically, that prices tend to fall in response to increased competition (see, e.g., Tirole 2000, 
Bain 1951), the relationship between quality and competition is far more ambiguous.  Theory 
papers have found the relationship to be positive (Schmalensee 1974), negative (Gal-Or 1983), 
and insignificant (Swan 1970).  Others suggest that it depends on modeling assumptions 
(Schmalensee 1979, Banker et al. 1998).  While theoretical work is inconclusive, empirical 
studies have generally found a positive relationship between market competition and quality 
(e.g., Domberger & Scherr 1989; Mazzeo 2003).  However, nearly all of these studies use cross-
sectional data, making causal inference difficult. Moreover, most of this research analyzes the 
relationship between market structure and average quality provision, including any entrants.  
Very little of this work focuses directly on the incumbents’ responses to entry. By using panel 
data, and excluding the entrants from our data, we are able to isolate the incumbents’ quality 
response to entry and entry threats.  
The second stream of related research focuses on strategic entry deterrence.  Several 
seminal theoretical papers (e.g., Dixit 1979, Spence 1981, Klemperer 1987) provide rationales 3 
 
for firms engaging in competitive actions before new competitors enter.  However, very few 
empirical papers have tested for such behavior.  Two recent examples are Dafny (2005), which 
tests for strategic investment, and Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), which tests for strategic price 
cutting.  This paper adds to this literature by being the first to test for strategic quality provision 
in response to an entry threat. 
The third stream of related research looks at on-time performance in the airline industry.  
One of the difficulties in assessing non-price responses to entry is measuring non-price forms of 
competition.  Recently, several papers have made use of an easily observable measure of service 
quality in the airline industry: on-time performance.  For example, Mazzeo (2003) and Rupp, 
Owens, and Plumly (2003) examine the impact of market structure on on-time performance. 
Prince and Simon (2009) assess the influence of multimarket contact on on-time performance. In 
addition, Rupp (2005) examines the causes of flight delays and cancellations, Januszewski 
(2004) studies the impact of on-time performance on demand for air travel, and Mayer & Sinai 
(2003) assess the impact of hubbing effects and congestion externalities on on-time performance.  
Collectively, this research indicates that on-time performance improves as markets become more 
competitive.  However, none of these papers directly analyzes the effects of entry (or threat of 
entry).  The relationship they find between quality provision and market structure is an average 
effect, including entrants' quality levels; they do not isolate incumbents’ responses to entry, nor 
do they allow them to depend on the characteristics of the entrant.   
We similarly exploit airline on-time performance in order to assess whether incumbent 
airlines adjust their service quality in response to entry and entry threats by Southwest.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, our results indicate that airlines’ on-time performance actually worsens in both 
cases.  Regarding actual entry, we argue that this result is consistent with predictions from 
theoretical models of price and quality competition, which predict that firms will differentiate 
along the quality dimension in equilibrium.  Given Southwest’s well-known superiority in on-
time performance, its entry into a market will tend to push incumbents “down” this dimension of 
quality as they differentiate away from Southwest.   
Furthermore, when Southwest threatens to enter a market, incumbents may have an 
incentive to move to the long-run (post entry) equilibrium of providing lower quality even before 
entry occurs.  We posit two reasons for this.  First, customer demand is unlikely to immediately 
respond to changes in on-time performance; a late arrival on a current flight may affect 4 
 
passengers’ future flight purchases, which may not occur for many weeks or months. Second, 
factors that influence on-time performance may be costly to adjust (e.g., laying off employees).  
Therefore, when Southwest’s entry is imminent, incumbents may find reducing on-time 
performance below current equilibrium levels to be profit enhancing, since the consequences for 
demand likely won’t occur until after Southwest has entered, and because their new equilibrium 
level of on-time performance is lower anyway. Neither of these explanations is suggestive of 
entry deterrence, but rather profit-maximizing behavior in the face of an impending new 
equilibrium
1
It is clear that our proposed explanation for why on-time performance worsens in 
response to entry by Southwest hinges on Southwest possessing a competitive advantage along 
this quality dimension.  In contrast, if the entrant had a similar cost structure, we would not 
expect to find such a response, since any differentiating movements by incumbents could be up 
or down the quality spectrum  (in section 3.3, we provide  evidence of Southwest's superiority in 
on-time performance). We test this idea by comparing the responses of incumbents threatened by 
entry from Southwest with those of incumbents threatened by an entrant that offers more average 
quality, Continental.  Our results are consistent with this hypothesis, as we find virtually no 
change in on-time performance by incumbents in response to entry or entry threats by 
Continental.  
.    
The implications of these findings are several.  To begin, they improve our understanding 
of how airlines compete.  We demonstrate that entry and entry threats by at least some airlines 
can cause incumbents to reduce their on-time performance as the firms move to a new 
equilibrium.  In addition, our analysis provides new insights into the ways firms respond to entry 
along non-price dimensions.  Prior theoretical and empirical work relating market structure to 
average quality provision often suggests that average quality and competition are positively 
correlated.  Our results show that, even in an industry where this relationship appears to hold 
(e.g., Mazzeo 2003), it does not imply that each firm will improve its quality in response to new 
competition, or to the threat of it.  Consequently, customers should not necessarily expect 
improved quality from incumbents when a new rival enters or threatens to enter a market.  
Taking a broader view, our results show that the welfare implications of entry, at least with 
                                                 
1 At the end of Section 2, we briefly discuss how this action could be part of a broader entry deterrence strategy, 
consistent with the one highlighted in Goolsbee and Syverson (2008). 5 
 
regard to quality, can depend on the entrant, and may involve the average consumer actually 
experiencing lower quality. 
 
2.  Theoretical Overview 
In addition to price, airlines compete along many dimensions.  Differentiating factors 
include: on-time performance, destinations served, flight times and frequencies, aircraft size, and 
customer service.  Airlines compete along these dimensions in many different markets, and 
against many different combinations of competitors with differing characteristics.  In contrast, 
theoretical models of non-price competition are relatively simple, in order to be tractable.  
Consequently, it is beyond the scope of this paper to develop a theoretical model explaining non-
price competition among airlines.  However, to build intuition for our empirical results, we 
review and draw upon related theoretical work (and relevant empirical findings) on non-price 
competition. 
 
2.1. Models of Quality Competition 
We begin by discussing models of quality (and price) competition in duopoly, where 
firms can differentiate only along a single dimension.  These are the models most heavily 
analyzed by the theoretical literature, apparently for tractability reasons.  We discuss competition 
along multiple dimensions and across more than two firms later in this subsection. 
For duopoly models with a single quality dimension, the general conclusion that emerges 
from equilibrium analysis is that firms will differentiate (often maximally) along the quality 
dimension (see Tirole 2000).  Following Tirole (2000) and Shaked and Sutton (1982), we lay out 
a simple two-stage model of two identical firms competing, first in quality and then in price.  We 
then solve for equilibrium.  Subsequently, we compare the equilibrium outcomes from this 
scenario to those under monopoly, and to those for a duopoly in which the firms have differing 
cost structures.   
In the model, consumers’ preferences are represented by U = θs-p if they consume one 
unit of a good with quality s and price p.  They can consume at most one unit, and have U = 0 if 
they consume no units.  The parameter θ represents taste for quality and is assumed to be 
distributed uniformly across the population of consumers between 𝜃 and 𝜃 = 𝜃 + 1.  Firms play 
a two-stage game.  In the first stage, they choose qualities (s), and in the second stage they 6 
 
choose prices (p).  After firms choose prices, consumers observe prices and quality and then 
choose which product to buy. 
To begin, we consider the case where there are two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2.  We 
assume each firm has a unit cost of production equal to 𝑐 ∗ 𝑠𝑖
2, 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. In solving for 
equilibrium locations, we solve for sH and sL, where, without loss of generality, we assume sH ≥ 
sL.    Following Tirole (2000), we simplify the analysis by assuming a minimal level of consumer 
heterogeneity and that the market is “covered,” i.e., each consumer buys one of the two brands
2




































8).  We note that the solution clearly demonstrates that firms will differentiate in 
equilibrium.  For the cases of linear marginal costs or c = 0, we would have found the familiar 
result of maximal differentiation.  As we see from our example, maximal differentiation is not a 
robust finding. However, as Tirole (2000) notes, “the principle of differentiation is more robust.” 
  Using the above example, we can assess how equilibrium qualities change when the 
market moves from one to two firms.  Here, we assume that there are no fixed costs of changing 
quality (e.g., there is no fixed cost of switching from s=.2 to s=.4).  To make the comparison, we 
first solve for a monopolist’s optimal quality in the same demand setting.  It is again easy to 









Now, if we make the benign assumption that 𝜃 <
5𝑐
4 − 1, this implies that the monopoly quality 
level is between the two duopoly quality levels.  Consequently, when a second firm enters and 
                                                 
2 These assumptions, and full details of the solution, are made explicit in the Appendix. 
3 Details of the solution are in the Appendix. 7 
 
the two firms move to the duopoly equilibrium quality levels, the incumbent may move to a 
higher or lower quality level, depending on which of the two possible equilibria ensues. 
  To help provide intuition as to how an incumbent monopolist would change its quality 
offering in response to entry, we consider the case where the entrant has a different cost structure 
from the incumbent.  This case is especially pertinent to our empirical setting, because it is likely 
that Southwest has a different (lower) cost structure than most other airlines.  Let the incumbent 
have unit cost of production equal to 𝑐1 ∗ 𝑠1
2 and the entrant have unit cost of production equal to 
𝑐2 ∗ 𝑠2
2, where c2 < c1.  Given this cost structure, we again solve for the duopoly equilibrium.   
The details of the solution are in the Appendix, but a couple of key points emerge.  First, 
we again find that firms will differentiate in equilibrium.  Second, while it is possible that the 
high-cost firm (the incumbent) would provide high quality and the low-cost firm (the entrant) 
would provide low quality in equilibrium, intuitively, such an outcome seems unlikely.  In 






We also note that the above analysis assumes that there are no adjustment costs when 
changing quality provision.  In reality, this almost certainly isn’t the case.  In particular, we 
might expect it to be especially costly for high-quality firms to adjust quality downward (due to 
reputational costs).  As we note in our data section, Southwest has a very strong reputation for 
on-time performance, suggesting that downward adjustments in quality would be particularly 
costly.  Although Southwest is an entrant, and therefore has no adjustments to make on the route 
in question, it may face adjustment costs from its existing “status quo” (e.g., their average 
, then  for any given pair of quality choices, overall profits are unambiguously higher when 
the high-cost firm provides low quality and the low-cost firm provides high quality.  Hence, 
when this condition holds, then for any equilibrium where the high-cost firm provides higher 
quality, overall profits would be higher if the firms simply switched places.  Of course, this 
doesn’t necessarily imply which equilibrium would ensue, but it does suggest a certain inferiority 
for any equilibrium with the high-cost firm providing high quality.     
                                                 




2𝜃, can break down in two ways.  First, we could have high c1 and low c2.  
In this case, the high-cost firm is likely unprofitable whether producing high or low quality; however, the low-cost 
firm makes more profits producing lower quality (with virtually no threat from the high-quality-producing, high-cost 
firm) compared to when it produces higher quality (and faces a greater possibility of price competition from its 
competitor at the low end).  Second, it could be that both firms have high costs.  In this case, the best hope for either 
firm to make profits is for the lower-cost firm to provide lower quality, and hence be able to price low enough to 
generate sales. 8 
 
performance on other routes they already serve).  Hence, if the low-cost (entrant) firm already 
has built a reputation for high quality in other markets, this would point even more strongly 
toward an equilibrium where the low-cost firm provides high quality and the high-cost firm 
provides low quality.  
For the above analysis, we restricted our attention to the case where firms differentiate 
along just one dimension.  Of course, in most markets (airlines included), firms compete along 
many dimensions.  The literature in this area generally shows that firms will differentiate along 
some dimensions and imitate along others (e.g., Ben-Akiva et al. 1989, Neven & Thisse 1990).  
Further, if one dimension is sufficiently dominant, firms will maximally differentiate along that 
dimension and minimally differentiate along all others (Irman & Thisse 1998)
5
Another restriction of note in the above analysis is that we limited our attention to shifts 
from monopoly to duopoly.  While the results for this case are rather clear-cut, they become less 
so when looking at the relationship between equilibrium quality provision and a general increase 
in competition.  A large amount of theoretical literature in this area assesses how firms’ quality 
provision responds to an increase in the number of competitors.  Focusing primarily on 
durability, Swan (1970) suggested that quality provision was independent of market structure.  
As summarized in Schmalensee (1979), a series of subsequent papers showed that this 
independence breaks down when some of Swan’s modeling assumptions are relaxed.  Hence, 
quality can depend on market structure, and model assumptions dictate whether or not this is the 
case.  More recent work has reiterated this conclusion.  For example, Banker et al. (1998) show 
.  Although the 
extant theoretical work on multidimensional differentiation suggests that differentiation should 
occur on some dimensions, it is not obvious ex ante which dimensions these will be.  The small 
amount of empirical work looking at incumbent non-price response to entry emphasizes this 
ambiguity.  For example, Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) find that cable television quality (in the 
form of, e.g., number of pay-per-view channels and channel capacity) increases with the entry of 
direct broadcast satellite.  This result suggests minimal differentiation, as cable tries to “keep 
pace” with satellite.  In contrast, Netz and Taylor (2002) find that spatial differentiation of retail 
gas stations is greater when the number of competitors increases.     
                                                 
5 This more extreme finding has been challenged in the empirical literature.  Specifically, Netz and Taylor (2002) 
state that: “Contrary to the predictions of the theoretical literature, we find that firms increase spatial differentiation 
as differentiation in other attributes increases.” 9 
 
that equilibrium quality in a market with N symmetric firms may be increasing or decreasing in 
N, depending on parameters underlying costs and demand.      
Empirical research has often found a positive relationship between quality and 
competition.  For example, Domberger & Scherr (1989) find that customer satisfaction in legal 
services increases with competition.  Similarly, Rupp et al. (2003) and Mazzeo (2003) find that 
on-time performance improves with competition, and Economides et al. (2008) show that new 
entry increases the number of types of local phone plans offered.  Domberger et al. (1995) find a 
weak, but positive, relationship between competition and cleaning service quality.  In sum, while 
the theoretical literature indicates that the relationship between quality and market structure can 
be of any sign, the empirical literature suggests that this relationship is often positive in practice.    
However, in many studies looking at quality’s relationship with competition, it is either 
implicitly assumed that firms will not want to differentiate along the quality dimension
6
  In our setting, the following key points emerge.  If on-time performance is a dimension 
along which airlines choose to differentiate in equilibrium, incumbent airlines will likely adjust 
their on-time performance away from Southwest’s when they enter.  Further, Southwest’s 
demonstrated superiority in on-time performance is suggestive of lower marginal costs for 
quality provision and high (downward) adjustment costs if they choose to provide low quality.  
Consequently, it is likely that Southwest will choose to provide high quality, and the incumbents 
will differentiate themselves from Southwest by providing worse on-time performance.  It is 
useful to note here that this prediction only applies to the case where the entrant is superior in on-
time performance; if instead the entrant has a similar cost structure to the incumbents and similar 
adjustment costs, differentiation could imply movement in either direction, resulting in an 
 of 
interest, or any differentiation is hidden within average measures.  For example, if a market is a 
monopoly and a new firm enters (creating a duopoly), the average quality provided by the firms 
may rise.  However, this could be the result of the two firms providing equal quality that is 
higher than the monopoly level, or it could be the new entrant providing high (low) quality while 
the incumbent chooses to offer low (high) quality.  Consequently, the empirical measures of 
average market quality are not especially informative when attempting to assess how incumbents 
react to entry. One must directly measure incumbent quality, excluding new entrants.     
                                                 
6 This assumption is actually explicit in papers like Banker et al. (1998), which assumes a symmetric equilibrium. 10 
 
ambiguous overall effect.  These insights provide the basis for our primary empirical analysis 
below. 
 
2.2. Quality Provision and Entry Threats 
The above discussion explains how incumbent quality may decrease in response to entry 
by firms with higher quality levels.  In this subsection, we discuss reasons why incumbents may 
have an incentive to move to the long-run (post entry) equilibrium, providing lower quality when 
there is only a threat, and entry has not yet occurred.   
There are several reasons why incumbents may initiate a quality response to an entry 
threat (before entry actually occurs) to deter entry.  Examples include capacity commitment 
(Dixit 1979), long-term contracting (Aghion & Bolton 1987), and switching costs (Klemperer 
1987).  However, incumbents performing worse in response to entry threats is inconsistent, both 
intuitively and analytically, with most entry deterrence strategies
7
Why then would firms initiate reductions in quality provision before entry actually 
occurs?  We posit two reasons for this, focusing on the case of airlines competing on on-time 
performance. First, any changes in on-time performance are likely to have a lagged effect on 
demand, both because arriving late on a current flight affects passengers’ future flight purchases, 
(which may not occur for many weeks or months), and because reporting of on-time 
performance data occurs with a lag.  When Southwest’s entry is imminent, incumbents may find 
reducing on-time performance below current equilibrium levels to be profit enhancing since the 
impact on demand likely won’t be felt until after Southwest has entered and their new 
equilibrium level of on-time performance is lower anyway.   
.   
Second, if factors that influence on-time performance are costly to adjust (e.g., laying off 
employees), airlines may have an incentive to gravitate toward post-entry equilibrium quality 
provision before entry occurs.  Specifically, whenever achieving the pre-entry equilibrium 
quality level requires increases in inputs, airlines may choose to forgo these increases and save 
adjustment costs, anticipating these inputs will soon be adjusted downward again after 
Southwest’s entry occurs.  This behavior would also tend to reduce incumbents’ on-time 
                                                 
7 We consider one possible exception at the end of this subsection where firms jointly lower on-time performance 
and price in order to boost current demand and increase switching costs. 11 
 
performance before Southwest enters. Neither of these behaviors is suggestive of entry 
deterrence, but rather profit-maximizing behavior in the face of an impending new equilibrium.   
While worsening on-time performance is unlikely to serve as an entry deterrent, we 
conclude by noting how this action could be part of a broader entry deterrence strategy.  
Goolsbee & Syverson (2008) provide evidence that airlines cut prices in response to an entry 
threat in order to increase current demand and establish long-term loyalty from their customers 
(e.g., through frequent flyer programs).  This price cutting increases switching costs when entry 
does occur.  In the Appendix we show that, under some plausible circumstances, airlines can 
generate even more current-period demand, while holding profits constant, by reducing quality 
(and costs), and cutting prices further.    
 
3.  Data 
 
3.1. Measurement of Entry and the Threat of Entry 
We examine incumbent quality responses to entry and entry threats using Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics data on on-time performance by the ten major carriers providing 
domestic service in the US from 1993–2004. We define a route as a directional origin-destination 
pair for which at least one carrier provides non-stop service. Moreover, because on-time 
performance is measured only for individual flights, we restrict our analysis to non-stop service. 
Our sample comprises the routes that Southwest threatened to enter during our sample time 
period. Like Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), we exclude routes from our sample where 
Southwest entered a second endpoint airport simultaneously with actually offering service on the 
route. In such cases we cannot cleanly identify the threat of entry separately from the actual 
entry. In total, we observe 277 routes that Southwest threatened to enter, of which Southwest 
actually entered 225 with nonstop service prior to the end of 2004.   
Our general approach to measuring entry and entry threats follows that of Goolsbee and 
Syverson (2008).  They note that when Southwest begins operating in airports on both sides of a 
route but not the route itself, the likelihood that Southwest will start offering service on that route 
in the near future rises dramatically.  Exploiting this fact, we define a route to be threatened by 
entry from Southwest when Southwest serves both endpoint airports on a route, but does not 
offer nonstop service on the route itself. For example, Southwest began flying out of 12 
 
Jacksonsville in 1997. Then, in the second quarter of 2004, it entered Philadelphia and began 
offering service from Philadelphia to Tampa.  Although it had not entered the Philadelphia to 
Jacksonville (or Jacksonville to Philadelphia) route, it now threatened that route because it 
offered service from both endpoint airports. We define the entry to occur during the quarter in 
which Southwest begins offering nonstop service on the threatened route. In the above example, 
entry occurred during the fourth quarter of 2004, when Southwest began offering nonstop service 
from Jacksonville to Philadelphia and vice versa.  
As the above example illustrates, entry and entry threats occur simultaneously for route-
pairs like Jacksonville to Philadelphia and Philadelphia to Jacksonville; when Southwest 
threatens or enters the route-pair in one direction, it also does so in the opposite direction. 
Therefore, in our estimation, we cluster our standard errors at the carrier-route-pair. In this way, 
we allow for correlation in the error terms among all observations for a carrier flying 
Jacksonville-Philadelphia or Philadelphia-Jacksonville (for example).   
To capture the full effect of both the threat of entry, and the actual entry, by Southwest, 
we create three sets of entry dummy variables. First, because airlines may become aware of 
Southwest’s expansion plans before they actually occur, we construct dummies to identify the 
quarters preceding the quarter in which Southwest enters the second endpoint airport of a route, 
and begins to threaten that route. In the above example, these dummy variables would identify 
the quarters preceding the fourth quarter of 2004. Second, we include a set of dummies to 
measure the period following the quarter in which Southwest establishes a presence in the second 
endpoint airport without offering service on the route. Third, we include a set of dummy 
variables to indicate the quarter of entry onto the route, i.e., the quarter in which Southwest 
begins offering nonstop service on the route, as well as subsequent quarters.  
We examine data for the 12 quarters preceding the quarter in which Southwest enters the 
second endpoint airport and first threatens the route, the quarter in which Southwest establishes a 
presence in the second endpoint airport, and the 12 quarters following the quarter in which 
Southwest establishes a presence at the second endpoint airport.   This yields 5200 carrier-route-
quarter observations for incumbent carriers on threatened routes.
8
   
  
                                                 
8 Like Goolsbee and Syverson, we do not have 25 observations for many carrier-routes because of truncation at the 
start of the sample, and because, in some case, the airlines did not fly the route throughout the entire 25-quarter 
period.   13 
 
3.2. Dependent Variables: On-Time Performance 
  For our dependent variables, we initially consider the three most frequently cited 
measures of on-time performance.  In published reports, the DOT generally defines a flight to be 
late if it arrives at the gate at least 15 minutes late. Hence, our first measure of on-time 
performance measures the proportion of carrier i’s flights on route r in quarter q that arrives at 
least 15 minutes late. Our second measure places stricter requirements for characterizing a flight 
as late.  Specifically, it measures the proportion of flights on route r in quarter q that arrives at 
least 30 minutes late.  Finally, we also measure the average number of minutes late (or early) that 
carrier i’s flights on route r in quarter q arrive at the gate, relative to its scheduled arrival time. 
 
3.3. Southwest’s On-Time Performance Record 
  A key point in our analysis is Southwest's superiority in on-time performance. To provide 
some evidence of this, Table 1 reports airline on-time performance rankings for each year in our 
sample. Among the major US carriers (on-time data is only gathered for US carriers with at least 
1% of the domestic market), Southwest had the best on-time performance (lowest percentage of 
flights arriving at least 15 minutes late) every year from 1993-1999. During the next five years, it 
had somewhat less consistent superiority, though still generally strong performance: it was 
second in on-time performance in 2000, fell to fifth in 2001, returned to first place in 2002, fell 
to sixth place in 2003, and improved to second place in 2004. Overall, Southwest had the highest 
on-time arrival rate of any major US carrier between 1987 (when data were first collected) and 
2004. These data strongly suggest that Southwest enjoyed lower marginal costs of on-time 
performance provision. They also suggest that Southwest would face greater adjustment costs in 
reducing its on-time performance, because of the substantial reputational costs it would incur.  
 
4.  Estimation Strategy 
To examine whether airlines vary their on-time performance in response to the threat of, 
or actual, entry by Southwest, we estimate a set of fixed-effects models for the various measures 
of on-time performance described above, as well as some others that we introduce below. The 
variables of interest are the dummy variables indicating entry and entry threats by Southwest.  In 
all models, we also include carrier-route fixed effects to control for unobserved differences 
across carriers and routes, and carrier-quarter fixed effects to control for any changes over time 14 
 
in the carrier’s overall on-time performance. Because we include carrier-route fixed effects in all 
models, and because we omit dummy variables for the 9
th-12
th quarters preceding the quarter in 
which Southwest establishes a presence at the second endpoint airport, our estimated coefficients 
indicate the carrier’s on-time performance in the dummy period relative to its performance in the 
period 2-3 years (9-12 quarters) prior to the quarter in which Southwest establishes a presence at 
the second endpoint airport, creating the threat of entry for the given route. As discussed above, 
in all models we cluster the standard errors at the carrier-route-pair level, to account for 
correlations in the standard errors.
9
Our primary regression is the following: 
 
 











+ 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑂𝑟𝑖𝑔𝐹𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 
 
Here, yijt is one of the dependent variables described above (as well as scheduled flight time and 
travel time, as discussed below).  The first two right-hand-side variables represent carrier-route 
and carrier-quarter fixed effects, respectively.  Next, the T variables represent dummies that 
capture the proximity of that observation to the Southwest threat.  For example, T
-78 equals one if 
the observation occurred 7-8 quarters before Southwest threatened to enter, T
-56 equals one if the 
observation occurred 5-6 quarters before Southwest threatened to enter
10
                                                 
9 We also tried clustering the standard errors at the route-pair level, to allow for correlations across carriers on the 
same route-pair. This actually yielded generally small standard errors. Therefore we report the more conservative 
results, clustering by carrier-route-pair.  
, etc. T
0 indicates the 
quarter in which Southwest actually enters the second endpoint airport, threatening the route. T
12 
indicates the first two quarters after Southwest has threatened the route, but before Southwest has 
actually started offering service on the route, while T
3+ indicates the 3rd-12th quarters after 
Southwest has threatened the route but not yet begun to fly on the route.  Similarly, the E 
variables indicate the number of quarters since Southwest begins offering service; E
0 indicates 
the quarter in which Southwest actually begins offering service on the route, E
12 indicates the 
first two quarters after Southwest begins offering service, while E
3+ indicates the 3rd-12th  
10 We defined the dummy variables to measures two or more quarters, rather than following Goolsbee and Syverson 
in using  single quarters, in order to obtain more robust estimates, that are less likely to be affected by unusual 
events in any one quarter. However, we obtain very similar results when we estimate our models defining the 
dummies in the same way as Goolsbee and Syverson.   15 
 
quarters after entry.  Finally, we include three additional control variables. Load controls for the 
average load factor, while OrigFlights and DestFlights are counts of the number of flights at the 
origin and destination airports, respectively.  
 
5.  Results 
In Table 2, we examine how incumbents’ arrival delays respond to entry and entry threats 
by Southwest. As can be seen, all three conventional measures of arrival delay indicate that 
incumbents’ on-time performance worsens. Looking at the first two models, we see that the 
fraction of the incumbent’s flights that arrive at least 15 (30) minutes late increases by about 6-9 
(3-5) percentage points in the quarter when Southwest enters a route and in the quarters that 
follow entry. This is a very large effect given that, on average, 21 (10) percent of flights arrive at 
least 15 (30) minutes late. Similarly, in the third model, the average arrival delay increases by 3-
4 minutes (from an average of 5.8 minutes) following entry by Southwest. Moreover, consistent 
with Goolsbee and Syverson (2008), the results in Table 2 indicate that airlines begin responding 
to the threat of entry before Southwest even threatens the route; incumbents' on-time 
performance begins to worsen before Southwest actually enters the second endpoint airport. 
Their arrival delays worsen further when Southwest enters the second endpoint airport (thus 
threatening the route) and even more when Southwest begins to offer flights on the route.
11
It is difficult to say precisely when airlines begin responding to the threat of entry by 
Southwest.  The results in Table 2 indicate that incumbents’ on-time performance worsens as 
early as 7-8 quarters prior to Southwest threatening the route. However, the results show that 
delays in quarter 5-6 prior to Southwest threatening the route are no different from the omitted 
comparison period.  The delays then begin increase again in quarters 3-4 prior to Southwest 
threatening the route, and generally increase in subsequent quarters. Thus, it appears that, 
consistent with Goolsbee and Syverson, the airlines generally begin to respond to the threat of 
entry 3-4 quarters before Southwest enters the second endpoint airport of a route.    
  
                                                 
11 As noted in Section 2.1, the predictions for monopoly routes threatened by entry are clearest. Therefore, we also 
estimated the models in Table 1 using only the monopoly routes that Southwest threatened. These make up about 
70% of our sample. The results for the monopoly routes are very similar to those reported for the full sample in 
Table 1.  16 
 
Importantly, as noted above, in these models (and in all other models below), we control 
for load factor and the number of flights at the endpoint airports. By controlling for Load
12
Although these results provide strong evidence that airline delays increase in response to 
entry and entry threats by Southwest, they do not shed light on how this occurs. We explore this 
in columns 4 and 5. First, we consider the possibility that delays increase because incumbents 
begin shortening scheduled flight times as a way to retain customers, in anticipation of 
Southwest entering with shorter flight times. The results in column 4 show that airlines do have 
shorter scheduled flight times in all periods relative to the base period (9-12 quarters prior to 
threat). However, the effect is relatively small (generally less than one minute), usually 
statistically insignificant, and is very stable across time periods relative to entry and entry threats, 
unlike our results for our delay measures.  Hence, this does not appear to be a viable explanation 
for the increases in arrival delays that we observe.
, we 
preclude the possibility that our results are being driven by more crowded flights (yielding more 
delays), resulting from incumbents cutting prices in response to the threat of entry and actual 
entry by Southwest. Similarly, by controlling for OrigFlights and DestFlights, we can eliminate 
the possibility that greater congestion at the endpoint airports, resulting from Southwest entry, is 
driving the increase in delays that we observe.  
13
                                                 
12 We recognize that load factor may be endogenous in our models of on-time performance. Therefore, we also 
instrument for load factor using the carrier's average load factor on flights from other airports. The results are very 
similar; load factor has a positive and statistically significant effect, and the effects of entry and entry threats remain 
qualitatively unchanged.  Based on these results, we can also exclude more crowded planes as an alternative 
explanation for our results. 
 Second, to further assess whether reductions 
in scheduled flight times could be driving the results reported in Table 2, we use a measure of 
delay, travel time, which is independent of the scheduled time for the flight. Travel time only 
measures the time from when the flight is scheduled to depart until the time that it actually 
arrives. In this way, it measures actual travel time plus the delay in departing the airport. It is 
unaffected by changes in the scheduled time for the flight. The results in column 5 show that 
travel time also worsened in response to entry and entry threats by Southwest; travel time 
increases by about 5-7 minutes following entry by Southwest. These results further verify that it 
was not simply shorter scheduled flight times that underlie the increase in arrival delays that we 
report in Table 2.  
13 To verify this, we also reestimated the model of arrival delays controlling for the scheduled flight time. We obtain 
very similar results to those reported in column 3.  17 
 
In Table 3, we examine incumbents' response to entry and entry threats by an entrant with 
average on-time performance, Continental.  The results show that incumbent arrival delays did 
not increase following entry by Continental, nor did they systematically increase prior to entry.  
If anything, these results show that incumbents reduced their travel time in response to entry by 
Continental.  When compared to Table 2, these results provide strong evidence that the airlines 
responded differently to the arrival of Continental than they did to the arrival of Southwest.  This 
is consistent with the argument derived in section 2 that most airlines, recognizing that they 
could not compete against Southwest on service, instead focused on cutting prices and costs in 
response to entry, and entry threats, by Southwest.   
  Next, we address two issues raised by Goolsbee and Syverson in their analysis. First, we 
consider whether our results are driven by our use of a three-year pre-threat window. To assess 
whether this choice is driving our results, we extend the pre-threat period to four years, and 
include dummies for quarters back to 12 quarters before Southwest threatens the route. This 
approach yields a one-year comparison period, quarters 13-16.  We report these results in Table 
4.  
  The pattern of results is very similar to those in Table 2, though the effects are not quite 
as strong or as statistically significant. Nonetheless, they provide additional evidence that 
incumbents offer worse on-time performance in the face of entry by Southwest. Moreover, the 
results in Table 4 clearly show that incumbents did not start responding to the threat of entry by 
Southwest more than two years before Southwest threatened to enter the market.  The spike in 
incumbents’ responses in the period 7-8 quarters before entry suggests that this result likely 
reflects some noise, and the results as a whole provide further support that incumbents likely 
began responding to the threat posed by Southwest’s entry about one year before Southwest 
started serving both endpoint airports of the route.  
Second, we consider whether our results reflect Southwest entering airports where service 
quality is worsening. To consider this possibility, we follow the strategy used by Goolsbee and 
Syverson, and control for incumbents’ on-time performance on routes between a threatened 
airport and airports that Southwest does not serve. The idea is to use the incumbents' on-time 
performance on routes to and from airports not served by Southwest to control for other changes, 
unrelated to Southwest’s imminent entry, at the threatened airports. For example, in the case of 
Southwest threatening to enter the Philadelphia-Jacksonville route, we would use the 18 
 
incumbent’s on-time performance on flights between Philadelphia
14
  We report the results of this analysis in Table 5. Again, the results are very similar to 
those reported in Table 2. These results preclude the possibility that our findings are driven by 
unobserved changes in the airports that Southwest threatens.  They provide more evidence that 
we are identifying the causal impact of entry and entry threats by Southwest on incumbent on-
time performance.  
 and other airports that 
Southwest does not serve, such as Laguardia, Boston, Reagan National, etc.  
  In Table 6, we re-estimate our baseline models (Table 2), weighting each observation by 
the average number of passengers flying on the carrier's route during our sample period.  These 
results provide a better assessment of the overall impact on passengers of incumbents' responses 
to the threat of entry by Southwest. The results are very similar to those in Table 2, though the 
coefficients are a little smaller. This suggests that incumbents may be a little more likely to 
compete with Southwest on larger routes; on smaller routes, the decision to reduce efforts in on-
time performance may be easier.  
In all of the above analyses, we include carrier-route and carrier-quarter fixed effects, in 
an effort to isolate the impact of the threat of, and actual entry. However, this approach imposes 
a cost, because it precludes an assessment of how airlines reorganize their operations and 
reallocate their resources and efforts over time, across routes, in response to entry by Southwest. 
To examine this issue, we reestimate our baseline models, including carrier, route, and quarter 
fixed effects (in place of carrier-quarter and carrier-route fixed effects). We report these results 
in Table 7. 
  The results in Table 7 generally show larger effects of entry and threat of entry than those 
reported in Table 2. The larger effects suggest that when airlines reduce their on-time 
performance efforts on routes threatened and entered by Southwest, they reallocate (some of) 




                                                 
14 We would also use incumbents’ on-time performance on flights between Jacksonville and airports that Southwest 
does not serve, but when Southwest began serving Philadelphia, the other airlines serving the Jacksonville airport 
only flew to other airports served by Southwest. That is, incumbents were not flying between Jacksonville and any 
airports not served by Southwest.   19 
 
Alternative measures of service quality   
  Although this paper focuses on on-time performance, we recognize that airlines compete 
on other dimensions of service quality. We examine how airlines respond on some of these other 
dimensions of service quality when Southwest threatens and enters new routes. We report the 
results in Table 8. The results show that airlines do not increase the number of flights they cancel 
on routes threatened by Southwest entry, while they do increase the number of departures that 
they offer on these routes. These results suggest that airlines may respond differently on other 
aspects of service quality when responding to entry by Southwest.  While increases in quality 
along other dimensions should not be surprising, these findings could raise some concerns about 
our results for on-time performance.  We discuss these below. 
  Regarding cancellations, our findings indicate no reduction in service quality (no increase 
in cancellations) in response to entry.  However, airlines cancel only about one percent of their 
flights in our sample, giving us much weaker identification power for this measure. Therefore, 
while airlines may think differently about cancellations than about on-time performance, it is 
difficult to draw meaningful conclusions from the cancellation results.  Regarding number of 
flights offered, one might be concerned that the increase in the number of flights that carriers 
offer in response to entry and entry threats by Southwest may be driving our on-time 
performance results: Airlines increase their flight frequency, which causes greater delays. To 
investigate this possibility, we re-estimated our baseline models, controlling for the number of 
flights the airlines offered on the route. Our results remain virtually unchanged by the inclusion 
of this variable.    
   
6.  Conclusion 
We examine whether entry and entry threats by Southwest Airlines cause incumbent 
airlines to improve their on-time performance as a way to protect their market share. Perhaps 
surprisingly, our results show that airlines did not improve on-time performance in response to 
Southwest; rather, incumbent on-time performance worsened. We argue that this finding can be 
consistent with a basic theoretical model of firms competing on price and quality, especially 
when the entrant has an advantage on the quality dimension being examined.  We corroborate 
this intuition by showing empirically that firms are virtually unresponsive in on-time 
performance to entry and entry threats by a rival with more average quality, Continental.   20 
 
Our findings generate several key takeaways.  First, they show that entry and entry 
threats by at least some airlines can cause incumbents to reduce their on-time performance as the 
firms move to a new equilibrium. Further, while prior theoretical and empirical work often 
suggests that average quality and competition are positively correlated, our results show that, 
even for an industry where this relationship appears to hold, it does not imply that each firm will 
improve its quality in response to new competition, or the threat of it.  More broadly, our 
findings suggest that the welfare implications of entry, at least with regard to quality, can depend 
on the entrant and may involve the average consumer actually experiencing lower quality. 
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Airline On-Time Rankings, 1993-2004 (Percentage of flights arriving less than 15 minutes late) 
 
1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  1987-
2004 
WN  WN  WN  WN  WN  WN  WN  TW  CO  WN  UA  OO  WN 
HP  NW  NW  NW  CO  TW  AA  WN  NW  TW  AA  WN  NW 
NW  HP  AS  US  NW  US  DL  NW  TW  CO  CO  B6  AA 
AS  AS  UA  CO  US  AA  US  DL  DL  NW  US  UA  CO 
TW  US  AA  UA  UA  CO  TW  CO  WN  US  HP  NW  HP 
AA  TW  HP  HP  AA  HP  CO  UA  AA  DL  WN  DL  US 
UA  AA  DL  AA  DL  UA  UA  AA  US  AA  NW  CO  DL 
US  CO  TW  AS  HP  NW  AS  US  AS  HP  DL  HP  AS 
DL  UA  US  DL  AS  DL  NW  AS  HP  UA  MQ  AA  UA 
CO  DL  CO  TW  TW  AS  HP  HP  UA  MQ  AS  AS  MQ 
We report the top ten carriers in each year. For every year except 2002 and 2004, this comprises 
all reporting airlines.    25 
 
Table 2 






























































































































































































           
N  5200  5200  5188  5188  5188 
All models include carrier-route and carrier-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by 
carrier-route-pair are reported in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 are marginal effects from 
fractional logit models, estimated using maximum likelihood, to account for the proportional 
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Table 3 
Incumbents’ on-time performance response to entry and entry threats by Continental 
 
  Proportion of 
flights arriving at 




























































































































































































           
N  1105  1105  1103  1103  1103 
All models include carrier-route and carrier-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by 
carrier-route-pair are reported in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 are marginal effects from 
fractional logit models, estimated using maximum likelihood, to account for the proportional 
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Table 4 
Incumbents’ on-time performance response to entry and entry threats by Southwest, using a longer pre-
threat window 
 
  Proportion of 
flights arriving 



















































































































































































































           
N  5392  5392  5378  5378  5378 
All models include carrier-route and carrier-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by 
carrier-route-pair are reported in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 are marginal effects from 
fractional logit models, estimated using maximum likelihood, to account for the proportional 
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Table 5 
Incumbents’ on-time performance response to entry and entry threats by Southwest, controlling for airport 
selection 
  Proportion of 
flights arriving 



















































































































































































































           
N  3409  3409  3394  3394  3394 
All models include carrier-route and carrier-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by 
carrier-route-pair are reported in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 are marginal effects from 
fractional logit models, estimated using maximum likelihood, to account for the proportional 
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Table 6 
Weighted estimation of incumbents’ on-time performance response to entry and entry threats by Southwest 
 
  Proportion of 
flights arriving 






















































































































































































           
N  5200  5200  5188  5188  5188 34 
 
All models include carrier-route and carrier-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by 
carrier-route-pair are reported in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 are fractional logit models, 
estimated using maximum likelihood, to account for the proportional nature of the dependent 
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Table 7 
Incumbents’ on-time performance response to entry and entry threats by Southwest, allowing for carriers to 






























































































































































































           
N  5200  5200  5199  5199  5199 
All models include carrier, route, and quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by carrier-
route are reported in parentheses. Models 1 and 2 are marginal effects from fractional logit 
models, estimated using maximum likelihood, to account for the proportional nature of the 
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Table 8 
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N  5200  5189 
All models include carrier-route and carrier-quarter fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by 
carrier-route-pair are reported in parentheses. Model 1 shows marginal effects from fractional 
logit models, estimated using maximum likelihood, to account for the proportional nature of the 









A.1. Equilibrium Solution Details 
 
  In this section, we provide the details for the three equilibrium solutions presented in 
Section 2.1.   
 
Duopoly with same costs: 
 
To ensure sufficient heterogeneity (which will ensure prices are non-negative) and that the 
market is covered, we make the following two assumptions: 
 
Assumption 1:  𝜃 ≥ 2𝜃  
 




3 ≤ 𝜃𝑠𝐿 
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In the second stage, we take location choices as given, and solve first order conditions in prices 




























Equilibrium location choices in the first stage are determined by solving first order conditions for 
the above profit functions in location choices (and verifying second order sufficient conditions), 





To solve the model, we can write demand and profits for the monopolist as follows: 
 




𝜋 = �𝜃 −
𝑝
𝑠
� ∗ (𝑝 − 𝑐𝑠2) 
 









)2 ∗ 𝑠 
Equilibrium location choice in the first stage simply optimizes the above profit function in s, the 
solution to which is reported in Section 2. 
 
 
Duopoly with differing costs: 
 












                                                 
15 Note that subscripts here generically refer to the firm that goes High or Low.  For example, cL refers to the cost for 





− 𝜃� ∗ (𝑝𝐿 − 𝑐𝐿𝑠𝐿
2) 
𝜋𝐻 = �𝜃 −
𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿
𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿
� ∗ (𝑝𝐻 − 𝑐𝐻𝑠𝐻
2) 
 
In the second stage, we take location choices as given, and solve first order conditions in prices 































Then, in the first stage, the first order conditions are: 
 
�2𝜃 − 𝜃 − 4𝑐𝐿𝑠𝐿�(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) − 𝑐𝐿𝑠𝐿
2 + 𝑐𝐻𝑠𝐻
2 = 0 
�2𝜃 − 𝜃 − 4𝑐𝐻𝑠𝐻�(𝑠𝐻 − 𝑠𝐿) − 𝑐𝐿𝑠𝐿
2 + 𝑐𝐻𝑠𝐻
2 = 0 
 
Unfortunately, this leaves us with two non-linear equations in two unknowns.  However, we can 





�𝜃 − 𝜃� = 𝑐𝐻𝑠𝐻 − 𝑐𝐿𝑠𝐿 
 
In principle, this condition could be satisfied if sH = sL.  However, looking again at the first order 
conditions, this can only occur if sH = sL = 0.  However, the second partials are non-negative for 42 
 
both variables when evaluated at 0, so this would not be an optimum.  Hence, we again have 
differentiation in equilibrium.   
 
Lastly, for a given location pair (sL, sH), we can derive the conditions under which πL + πH is 
greater when cH = c2 compared to when cH = c1.  In words, we want to determine the conditions 
under which it is more profitable in the aggregate for the low-cost firm (c2) to go high than when 
the low-cost firm goes low.  Given locations, we need only simplify when: 
 





















With a bit of algebraic simplification, this inequality becomes: 
 





To ensure this inequality holds for any location pair, we can replace the denominator with the 
highest possible values for sL and sH, 𝜃.  Therefore, this inequality will hold for any location pair 
if we have: 
 













A.2. Worse On-time Performance as a Means of Entry Deterrence 
 
In this section, we discuss in greater detail how providing worse on-time performance 
may be a component of a larger entry deterrence strategy (involving price cutting) to generate 
customer loyalty.  To see this, we provide a simple example.  Specifically, we consider a case 
where an incumbent monopolist wishes to maximize current demand subject to a profit 43 
 
constraint.  That is, the incumbent is willing to lose some money (relative to the profit 
maximum) in the short-run to increase current demand and hopefully long-run switching costs.  
Hence, it seeks the optimal price/quality combination that maximizes current demand subject to a 
given profit loss.  For our example, let demand be: 
 
(1)  𝑄 = 𝑧 − 𝑎 ∗ 𝑃 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝐿 + 𝑐 ∗ 𝑃 ∗ 𝐿 
 
Here, Q is quantity, P is price, L is quality, and <z,a,b,c> is a vector of scalars.  Note that the last 
term allows sensitivity to quality to depend on the price.  We further assume that marginal costs 
of production are zero, but there is an increasing fixed cost of quality provision: 
 
(2) 𝐹(𝐿) = 𝑑 ∗ 𝐿2 
 
Here, d is another scalar.  When an entry threat emerges, the monopolist then solves the 
following: 
 
(3) 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑃,𝐿  𝑧 − 𝑎 ∗ 𝑃 + 𝑏 ∗ 𝐿 + 𝑐 ∗ 𝑃 ∗ 𝐿 
s.t. Π∗ − Π(𝑃,𝐿) ≤ 𝐾 
 
Here, Π
* are maximal monopoly profits, Π(𝑃,𝐿) = 𝑃 ∗ 𝑄 − 𝑑 ∗ 𝐿2 are profits as a function of 
price and quality, and K is the amount of lost current profits the firm is willing to tolerate in 
order to boost short-run demand.  In short, the monopolist chooses price and quality to maximize 
present demand subject to a given profit loss.  For a wide range of parameters (with c > 0), the 
solution to (3) involves a quality choice that is unambiguously lower than the quality choice that 
would achieve Π
*.  For example, when we set <z,a,b,c,d> = <40,10,0.05,0.10,10> and K = 8, the 
constrained demand-maximizing quality choice is 7% lower than the profit-maximizing quality 
choice (further, the price is 45% lower, consistent with a price and quality slashing strategy to 
boost demand).  Hence, the entry deterrent quality level is lower than the monopoly level.  
Intuitively, this is because the marginal profit from lowering quality and price from pre-entry 
(and pre-entry threat) levels is positive.   
 